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AVAHAN, the world’s largest HIV prevention programme
to date, needs no introduction to the international preven-
tion community. Since its launch in 2003, AVAHAN and
partners published over 100 papers in the peer reviewed
literature in addition to the many presentations at AIDS
conferences.
Time for some reflections on how AVAHAN was
designed, implemented and evaluated. What are the les-
sons learned for planning and managing HIV prevention
programmes?
The programme design: did they do the right
thing?
AVAHAN ‘s choice to focus on prevention in early 2000
was timely and strategically right. India was experiencing a
rapidly growing epidemic, concentrated in female sex
workers and their clients, high risk MSM and transgender,
and injecting drug users in the North east [1]. The deci-
sion to focus on key populations only was controversial at
the time, because of the ongoing debate whether India’s
epidemic was becoming a generalized epidemic. Moreover,
around 2003 -5 the world wide efforts and resources went
almost entirely to antiretroviral scale up, making it hard to
put prevention on the agenda. Looking at it now, the strict
focus on targeted prevention was certainly one of the criti-
cal steps towards success. Based on “understanding the
Indian epidemic” the response was tailored to the key
populations, at highest risk for acquiring and or transmit-
ting HIV and in the highest prevalence states. The popula-
tions were mapped, as well as the already ongoing
programmes implemented by the government and other
partners, and AVAHAN opted to cover the large gaps.
The core programme components offered to the key
populations were evidence based [2,3], and adapted to
the specific needs of the populations in India. They
included: peer-led outreach and behaviour change
communication; services for STI testing and care and
condom promotion and distribution; and harm reduction
for injecting drug users. Community mobilization
approaches, cutting across all programmes, were essential
to AVAHAN’s programme design. The positive experi-
ences from the Indian Sonagachi sex worker programme
were inspiring [4]. Dr Jana, a key leader from Sonagachi,
advised AVAHAN in the design phase. But the decision
to include community mobilization was equally driven
by pragmatism and common sense. The senior staff
of AVAHAN recognized that creating an enabling envir-
onment when working with highly stigmatized and mar-
ginalized populations was essential for programme
improvement. Police harassment or violence against
women, which could impede uptake of services or use of
condoms, were addressed. It also became clear that the
populations targeted had more pressing needs than HIV
prevention, which could be met. Those included, for
example, a cash transfer system with cell phones for the
sex workers, a safe haven drop in center for transgenders
or shower facilities for the truck drivers. Support to “self-
organization” of the communities was seen as a way to
enhance community buy-in eventually resulting in a
more sustained response. Was this evidence-based policy
making? Strictly speaking no, because there is little
empirical evidence that such structural interventions
reduce HIV transmission [5]. And this will likely remain
so because of the complexity of obtaining this evidence
with the gold standard methods. Was it the right deci-
sion? Certainly yes, because it made sense, from a pro-
gramme logic perspective. It was sound prevention
planning, taking into account the dynamics of the local
epidemic, the populations in their context, the evidence
base and the “lessons learned from other programmes”.
And the intention was “learn as we go”. The only critical
note may be that AVAHAN’s evaluation design did not
include the community mobilization from the start. More
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reflection on how those processes could be defined,
quantified, and evaluated in a prospective way would
have been helpful, and allow to make a stronger case
about relative contribution of the community mobiliza-
tion components to the overall impact.
Programme implementation: did they do it right?
Undoubtedly, AVAHAN is an example of rapid scale up
and implementation success [6]. It reached its coverage
targets as planned, ultimately resulting in good outcomes
and impact. As an illustration, together with 9 lead part-
ners, 134 grass roots organizations were supported to train
over 7000 peer educators to reach 280.000 sex workers in
less than 3 years. The question is therefore not whether
rapid scale up happened, but rather how that happened.
Most of the senior management team of AVAHAN
came from the private sector, and had strong management
experience. It has been said numerous times, the “business
approach” is without any doubt a key ingredient for the
rapid scale up, good programme uptake or consistent
commodity supply [7]. No matter how sound the pro-
gramme planning and design, if no attention is paid to the
management details, the result will be programme failure.
Relevant lead partners and grass roots NGO’s were care-
fully selected. A sense of urgency was introduced from the
beginning. The option was scaled design, not scaling up
from a pilot project, and the approach was clearly result
oriented. An extensive monitoring system was set up,
tracking all programme components including at the
lowest community level. And last but not least, the data
were used for regular programme review and adjustments.
Not just for the donor or for presentation in international
conferences. There were also attempts to measure pro-
gramme quality, even if that component is so far the least
developed.
The lesson learned here is that prevention programmes
can and should benefit more from private sector experi-
ence. Key business management principles and public
health programming may seem two different worlds with
little in common. AVAHAN with its atypical senior man-
agement staff, has been a good illustration that business
approaches can greatly enhance public health programmes
[7]. A better mix of managers and “health problem“
experts could advance the HIV prevention agenda as well
as other public health challenges.
Programme evaluation: did it work?
Recently, Ng and colleagues estimated that AVAHAN
had averted 100.178 new HIV infections in a 5 years per-
iod between 2003-08. [8]. This number can be critized
for the way it was obtained ( methods and data used),
and the high levels of uncertainty [9], but it is encoura-
ging to see the impact finally quantified. More than
100.000 human beings saved from suffering, lifelong
treatment or premature death. It helps to convince the
critics about the effectiveness of prevention in general.
And it makes a strong case that large scale prevention
programmes, offering basic programme components to
sex workers, without the new magic- bullets prevention
tools such as male circumcision and ART as prevention,
can have a significant effect at the population level.
But those estimates are just the cherry on the cake of an
extensive evaluation effort that accompanied the imple-
mentation of AVAHAN [10]. The prospective evaluation
design included at least 2 consecutive surveys, integrated
behavior and biologic assessments (IBBA) in all targeted
populations, several district population based surveys,
monitoring of programme implementation data and inter-
vention uptake, as well as cost estimates. And investment
with modeling was extensive. After summarizing and tri-
angulating the overwhelming amount of data, the effec-
tiveness of AVAHAN is truly convincing. Encouraging
trends in condom uptake and declines in STI and HIV
rates in key populations are observed almost consistently.
The triangulation of programme scale up data, with out-
come data and trends if HIV in key populations and in
pregnant women, allow for a strong plausible case that
AVAHAN has had impact. It contributed significantly to
the overall decline of HIV among sex workers, and their
clients, and subsequently in the general population in
some states. The impact is less convincing in the Northern
states, where injecting drug use is the main mode of trans-
mission, partly due to less data available so far to be used
in the triangulation and modelling. There is a need to
build a more coherent case of evidence of harm reduction
impact, using as much quantitative and qualitative data.
Evaluation design: issues and missed
opportunities?
Despite careful planning and sufficient funding, the pro-
spective evaluation design has been criticized for not hav-
ing implemented the programme in a randomized phase
fashion [8,11]. It is clear that such a large scale programme
could not have been implemented easily in a randomized
way, and ethical debates within India prevented it. But
AVAHAN was right not to adapt and complicate their
implementation only to suit the needs of a “probability
evaluation design”. Requesting large scale programs to
implement in a randomized way so that impact can be
assessed, is worrisome [12]. Especially if this leads to
slower scale up or more narrow programme packages,
leaving out the context specific community responses.
Another criticism was the lack of a real baseline. The
first IBBA round was done when the programmes were
already well in place. While regrettable, the many logistic
constraints, not the least of ethical clearances, prevented
the assessments from being completed in time to be true
baselines. But a more fundamental question can be
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asked. Is it ethical and possible to do an anonymous
survey including blood drawing among a highly margina-
lized population of sex workers, before gaining their con-
fidence and putting any services in place? The need for
rigorous evaluation designs is recognized, but not at a
cost of invasive strategies that can cause harm of discri-
mination or stigmatisation.
Have there been no missed opportunities with regard to
impact measurement in AVAHAN? More real life evalua-
tion at the programme and clinic sites would have been
useful. This approach could have produced baseline data
on critical parameters such as condom use among first
attenders. Even if those absolute estimates are biased, they
are useful for interpretation of trends, and provide argu-
ments to build a plausible case of possible programme
impact. Also more qualitative data could have strength-
ened the learning dimension, on why impact occurred
where. And thirdly, the evaluation of the community
mobilization approaches should have been planned in
advance, as was done for the rest of the programme. This
is recognized now, and attempts are made to try to evalu-
ate the contribution of the community mobilization to the
impact in a retrospective way, using theoretical frame-
works and modeling.
How much evaluation is enough?
Looking at the huge amount of data that have been col-
lected, and still is being collected and analyzed to evaluate
the different aspects of the programme, the question arises
whether the effort and resources for evaluation are still in
balance with those for implementing more programmes?
The answer depends on whom you ask the question: the
funder, the government of India, the stakeholders and
beneficiaries of the programmes or the International Pre-
vention Community.
The Bill and Melinda Gates foundation, as funder should
be very satisfied with the rapid scale up, programme fide-
lity and uptake of this programme, including large scale
behavior changes. And even more about the growing evi-
dence that Avahan contributed significantly to the declin-
ing trend of the Indian HIV epidemic, in addition to non-
HIV outcomes, such as reduction in violence against
women. It will be essential to digest this wealth of evalua-
tion data into a few key lessons and main messages for the
government of India and the national and regional AIDS
control program. Now that Avahan is in the process of
being transitioned to the Government, justification to con-
tinue with targeted programs and community approaches
while keeping the momentum on Prevention, will be
essential. In addition, lessons learned from regional varia-
tions in programme success and quality should be shared.
The communities as the beneficiaries of the programme
deserve to be informed about the main evaluation results,
because they were not only part of the problem, but also
part of the solution.
For the international HIV prevention evidence base,
AVAHAN’s extensive evaluation efforts are crucial. For
the first time, it has been shown, with a prospective
design, that a large scale targeted HIV prevention pro-
gramme, including standardized programme packages
reinforced with community mobilization approaches, is
possible and works. It leads to improved outcomes and
prevents new infections in the population most at risk,
ultimately affecting the epidemic as whole. A summary
paper, or rather a book, analyzing carefully the key
pieces of the evidence, is urgently needed.
The prevention world is currently facing new dilem-
mas such as antiretroviral treatment for prevention,
when large numbers of AIDS patients worldwide are
still dying because of lack of access. The lessons learned
from AVAHAN may bring some realism to this debate.
Prevention “ back to the basics” can prevent many HIV
infections. In areas of Africa or Asia, where scale and
coverage of interventions for most at risk populations
remains the greatest challenge, this could be a way to
start!
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